

**MONROE D. KIAR  
TOWN ATTORNEY  
TOWN OF DAVIE  
6191 SW 45th Street, Suite 6151A  
Davie, Florida 33314  
(954) 584-9770**

**TOWN ATTORNEY REPORT**

DATE: November 26, 2002

FROM: Monroe D. Kiar

RE: Litigation Update

1. **Sunrise Water Acquisition Negotiations:** The Town requested competitive proposals for providing engineering services to conduct a western area utilities study. The Bid Selection Committee ranked URS as its first choice. At the Town Council Meeting of October 3, 2001, a resolution was approved selecting URS to provide engineering services for the western area utilities study and authorizing the Town Administrator to negotiate an agreement with URS for such services. The Town Attorney's Office has spoken with Mr. Cohen, who indicated that negotiations with URS for such services have been ongoing. Mr. Cohen indicated that the Town recently met with representatives from URS and requested that URS provide to the Town a Memorandum of Services setting forth the anticipated costs for each service to be rendered. The Town has just received a response from URS and it will be reviewing same to determine the precise cost of this project and to further determine if there are funds presently available to allow for the retaining of URS to conduct such services this fiscal year. Mr. Cohen further advises that the Town has received considerable documentation from the City of Sunrise which his staff has been sorting through. There are ongoing discussions at this time with Sunrise regarding the documentation provided to the Town.
2. **Seventy-Five East, Inc. and Griffin-Orange North, Inc. v. Town of Davie:** A Final Order and Judgment Granting Petition for Common Law Certiorari was entered by Judge Patricia Cocalis in these two consolidated cases. Pursuant to the direction given to Mr. Burke by the Davie Town Council, an appeal of the Order entered by Judge Cocalis was filed with the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal, but the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal denied the Town's Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the Merits and Without Opinion, ordered that the matter be remanded back to the Town Council and required it to vote on the application based on the record as it existed prior to the filing of the Writ of Certiorari and in accordance with the Final Judgment entered by Judge Cocalis. The Petitioner requested the matter again be placed on the Town Council Agenda and the matter was again heard on October 2, 2002, by the Town Council. After a presentation by Mr. Burke, the applicant and Staff evidence was presented by those in attendance who spoke in favor and in opposition to the two Petitions, the Town Council voted 4 to 1 to deny each petition. A Petition for Supplemental

Relief to Enforce Mandate, or in the Alternative, Supplemental Complaint for Writ of Mandamus and for Writ of Certiorari has been filed by the Plaintiffs, Griffin-Orange North, Inc. and Seventy-Five East, Inc. with regard to the Quasi Judicial Hearing held before the Town of Davie on October 2, 2002. The Plaintiffs have filed these pleadings requesting that the Court order the Town of Davie to grant it the B-3 zoning and they are seeking a recovery of their attorneys' fees and court costs for their preparation and filing of this new Petition for Supplemental Relief to Enforce the Court's Mandate. Essentially, the pleadings request that the Circuit Court quash the Town Council's second denial of the Plaintiffs' zoning application and request that the Court compel approval of the B-3 zoning designation. The Plaintiffs have filed the pleadings with the same Court (Judge Cocalis) which previously entered a Final Judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and have also filed an identical original action to cover all of their procedural basis. The Town Attorney's Office has reviewed the new pleadings and has spoken this date in length with Mr. Burke, our special counsel, with regard to the contents of those pleadings. Mr. Burke has indicated that he will file an appropriate response thereto in a timely manner. As of this date, no hearing has been set for oral argument.

3. **MVP Properties, Inc.:** The Plaintiff previously filed a multi-count lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida where a Final Summary Judgment in favor of the Town and against Plaintiff, MVP Properties, Inc. was granted by the Court. MVP Properties, Inc. appealed to the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals which later affirmed the decision of the lower court in favor of the Town of Davie and against the Plaintiff, MVP Properties, Inc. The Town is currently pursuing collection of the Judgment for costs that has been obtained from MVP Properties, Inc. In the meantime, MVP Properties, Inc. has instituted a new lawsuit in which it has filed a Complaint for Inverse Condemnation against the Town of Davie. The Florida League of Cities declined to represent the Town in this latest lawsuit as actions for inverse condemnation are excluded from coverage by the League. Accordingly, the Town Attorney's Office has reviewed the Complaint for Inverse Condemnation filed by MVP Properties, Inc. against the Town of Davie and has timely filed a Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint. Said Motion to Dismiss had been scheduled for hearing for Tuesday, October 29, 2002, at 2:00 P.M. The Plaintiff however, requested that the hearing be continued to a later date and the hearing is now scheduled to be heard in February, 2003. The Town Attorney's Office is confident in the outcome of this litigation.
4. **Town of Davie v. Malka:** The Town Attorney's Office spoke with the Building Department on November 25, 2002. Once again, Mr. Craig confirmed that his staff is keeping a close eye on this particular property owner to insure that the property owner is moving ahead with final completion of all additions to the structure as promised. According to the Building Official, there have been no recent complaints from the community.
5. **City of Pompano Beach, et al v. Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services:** As indicated in prior Litigation Reports, on May 24, 2002, Judge Fleet issued a 19 page Order on the Motion for Temporary Injunction in which he concluded that the Amendments regarding the Citrus Canker litigation enacted by the Florida Legislature as codified in Florida Statutes Section 581.184, was an invalid invasion of the constitutional safeguard contained in both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Florida. The Judge ultimately entered a statewide Stay Order enjoining the Department of

Agriculture from entering upon private property in the absence of a valid search warrant issued by an authorized judicial officer and executed by one authorized by law to do so. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services filed its Notice of Appeal seeking review by the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal. The Department of Agriculture also filed a Motion with the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal seeking that the appellate procedures be expedited, and a motion in which there was a suggestion for “bypass” certification to the Supreme Court of Florida. The Department of Agriculture contended that in light of the gravity and emergency nature of the issues, the matter should be certified by the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal directly to the Supreme Court for its adjudication since the Department of Agriculture anticipated that regardless as to how the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal rules on the matter, it would in fact be appealed by either the Department of Agriculture or by the County and coalition of cities to the Supreme Court of Florida for final adjudication. The 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal in fact for only the fourth time in its history, did certify this matter directly to the Florida Supreme Court for adjudication. The Florida Supreme Court however, refused to hear this matter at this stage and remanded it back to the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal for further proceeding. Both the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the County and coalition of cities have filed their respective Appellate Briefs. The Florida Department of Agriculture recently filed a Reply Brief to the Brief filed by Broward County and the coalition of cities. The Town Attorney again spoke with the office of the Chief Appellate Attorney for Broward County, Andrew Meyers, on November 25, 2002. As this office previously advised the Town Council, oral argument in these proceedings has been set by the 4<sup>th</sup> District Court of Appeal for December 4, 2002, in Palm Beach County. The County Attorney has requested that as many city attorneys as possible be present during the oral argument to show their support for the County’s position. Accordingly, the Town Attorney’s Office will have a representative present at the oral argument on that date.

6. **Christina MacKenzie Maranon v. Town of Davie:** The Town of Davie filed a Motion for Summary Final Judgment on behalf of the Town of Davie and Police Officer Quentin Taylor seeking to dismiss both parties as defendants in this lawsuit. In response, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint naming the Town of Davie only as a defendant. Officer Taylor was no longer named a party to these proceedings. The Florida League of Cities attorney assigned to this case has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and has advised the Town Attorney’s Office that if it is not granted, he will again file a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Town Attorney’s Office conferred with Mr. McDuff’s on November 25, 2002, regarding the status of this case and was advised that the Judge has still not yet ruled upon the Town’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. If the Motion to Dismiss is denied, then Mr. McDuff anticipates filing a Motion for Summary Judgment. It is his belief that this case will ultimately be dismissed by the Court in its entirety.
  
7. **Reinfeld v. Town of Davie, et al:** Previously, both the Town Administrator and former Vice Mayor Weiner were dismissed as defendants in this lawsuit. The matter was previously scheduled to be tried in May, 2002, but at the request of Ms. Reinfeld’s legal counsel, it was postponed to be tried during the two week trial period commencing October 7, 2002. The Town filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court rendered an opinion granting in part, the Town’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff, Gail Reinfeld, was given the opportunity to file another Amended Complaint and she did so. Thereafter, the Town filed an Answer and Defenses to the Second Amended Complaint and another Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. In the meantime, Ms. Reinfeld's attorneys made an offer to settle the case for \$60,000.00 which the Florida League of Cities rejected. The Court thereafter, granted the Town's request for a Summary Judgment in its favor with respect to the Equal Protection Gender Discrimination claim asserted by the Plaintiff in her Second Amended Complaint. In her original Complaint, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit consisting of 5 counts, but only 1 count survived the Motion for Summary Judgment. Prior to the matter being tried, the Town Attorney and the Town Administrator received a call from Mr. Burke indicating that the Plaintiff Reinfeld had offered a lesser settlement amount and the Florida Municipal Investment Trust has accepted the offer and settled the case to avoid the cost of trial. Upon receipt by the Town Attorney's Office of a copy of the Order of Dismissal in this case, a copy was provided to the Town for distribution to the members of the Town Council. As this matter has now been settled, the Town Attorney's Office will now close its file on this case.

8. **Spur Road Property:** Mr. Burke had previously given a presentation to the Town Council and at that time, advised the Council that the Division of Administrative Hearings had ruled against the Town of Davie's protest to the Department of Transportation's award of the property to the highest bidder, and that a Final Order had been entered by the Department of Transportation adopting the recommendations of the Judge for the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Council then authorized Mr. Burke to take an appeal of the Final Order that was entered against the Town and Mr. Burke timely filed a Notice of Appeal. The Clerk of the Department of Transportation thereafter, prepared the Record for Appeal and the Appellate Brief was prepared and timely filed by Mr. Burke's office. In the meantime, the Department of Transportation continues to own the property and has not transferred title to the highest bidder. The Florida Department of Transportation filed its Brief and the Town filed its Reply Brief. The Town Attorney has again spoken with Mr. Burke, our special counsel, regarding the status of this matter. Mr. Burke has again reconfirmed that oral argument in this case is set for December 17, 2002.
9. **Peter Castagna v. Officers Brito and Williams:** Peter Castagna filed a lawsuit against Officers Daniel Brito and Paul Williams alleging an action for damages pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983, for alleged false imprisonment, battery and alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The outside legal counsel assigned by the Florida League of Cities to defend the police officers at the League's expense, filed a Motion to Dismiss the lawsuit instituted by Mr. Castagna. Prior to the Motion being heard, the attorneys for Mr. Castagna filed an Amended Complaint and our special outside legal counsel has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. The Town Attorney's Office spoke with Mr. McDuff's Office this date, November 25, 2002, and was advised that the Motion to Dismiss is still pending. In the meantime, the case has been scheduled for trial for May, 2003. In the meantime, the deposition has been taken of the Plaintiff's psychologist with regard to this case. The Plaintiff's psychologist confirmed that he last saw the Plaintiff several months prior to the June 25, 1999 incident which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and that the Plaintiff had been disabled as a result of a severe back injury pre-existing the incident of June 25, 1999. The doctor attributed much of the Plaintiff's problems to a pre-existing condition. Mr. McDuff and his colleague, Scott Alexander, who attended the deposition, have indicated they were quite satisfied with the deposition of the Plaintiff's psychologist. As indicated in prior reports, it is the belief of our Florida League of Cities attorney that it is

very questionable that the police conduct on June 25, 1999 resulted in the problems which the Plaintiff contends he now has as a result of the incident of June 25, 1999, and that the evidence will show that there was no improper conduct by the police officers in this matter

10. **Covenant House of Florida, Inc. v. Town of Davie:** A Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Writ of Mandamus and Supplementary or Alternatively, a Petition for Relief Pursuant to Section 163.3215, Fla. Stat. (2002), was furnished to the Town Attorney's Office as well as Mayor Venis by mail on June 14, 2002, and received by the Town Attorney's Office on June 17, 2002. The pleading was immediately forwarded to the Town Administrator with the request that the Florida League of Cities be contacted to see if they would provide legal defense for the Town with regard to this lawsuit at its expense, under its policy of insurance with the Town. The Florida League of Cities accepted the case and assigned outside legal counsel to represent the Town. The Petitioner originally sought an Order to Show Cause from Judge Estella Moriarty, but Judge Moriarty recused herself as she had been previously affiliated with Covenant House of Florida. Since then, the case has been reassigned to Judge Carney and an Order to Show Cause has been entered by Judge Carney requiring that the Town respond to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Writ of Mandamus. The special legal counsel assigned by the Florida League of Cities filed his response to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Writ of Mandamus. The Town received a settlement proposal from the Plaintiff Covenant House Florida, Inc. and an executive session was held on September 12, 2002, allowing the Council to consider same. The Town Council entered into a contract for the purchase of the real property which is the subject of the lawsuit, and as part of the settlement proposal, upon completion of the purchase, the lawsuit would be dismissed. The Town was given 51 days in which to conduct its due diligence and within that period of time, the Town received a satisfactory survey for the property, two appraisals, the title work and the Town Staff was able to complete its environmental study to its satisfaction. The Town Council at its meeting of November 6, 2002, accordingly gave its final approval to the purchase of the Covenant House property located on Orange Drive, and to the settlement of the pending lawsuit. The closing took place on Thursday, November 14, 2002, and the Town is now the owner of the subject property. The Town Attorney's Office spoke with our outside counsel assigned by the Florida League of Cities, Mr. Burke, and he confirmed that the proposed Order of Dismissal has been submitted to the Court for its ratification and approval. Upon receipt of an Order of Dismissal, the Town Attorney's Office will provide a copy of same to the Town for distribution to the members of the Town Council. The deed to the subject property has been filed with Broward County for recording and upon receipt of the recorded document from Broward County, the original will be forwarded to the Administrator and Clerk for safekeeping.
11. **Pelican Coast Holdings, Inc. and William Cuthbertson v. Town of Davie:** A Petition for Certiorari was served upon the Town along with an Order to Show Cause signed by Judge Burnstein requiring the Town of Davie to show cause why the relief requested in the Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. On July 22, 2002, Appellee, Town of Davie, filed its response to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Pelican Coast Holdings, Inc. and William Cuthbertson have since filed their Reply Brief. Oral argument in this matter was held on October 3, 2002 and thereafter, both side submitted Memorandum of Law in support of their respective positions. On October 28, 2002, Judge Burnstein issued her Order in this case. The Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and quashed the condition

imposed by the Town Council at its May 15, 2002 Meeting that the owner of the property obtained a “special permit” from the Council, if the owner seeks to serve alcoholic beverages at the site. The Court does however, make clear that the owners and users of the property are bound by the separation requirements for alcoholic establishments, but the Court proposes that the Town would be able to monitor the owner’s compliance through its occupational licensing regulations. The Court has also ruled that the Petitioner is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees in prosecuting the appeal. A copy of Judge Burnstein’s Order of October 28, 2002 was previously provided to the Mayor and Councilmembers. At the last Town Council Meeting, the Council authorized Mr. Burke’s firm to file the necessary paperwork to challenge Judge Burnstein’s Order of October 28, 2002. Mr. Burke confirmed in his discussion with the Town Council this date, November 25, 2002, that an appropriate pleading will be filed on Wednesday, November 27, 2002, within the time permitted for doing so.

12. **Math Igler Groves (Town of Davie v. Rober Corporation, Inc.):** On June 4, 2002, a full day trial of this matter was conducted by the Town Attorney’s Office and Code Enforcement. At the conclusion of the trial, the Special Master requested that the Respondent, Rober Corporation, and the Town of Davie each submit a Memorandum of Law in support of their respective positions. The position of the Town of Davie was that Rober Corporation, Inc. was operating a convenience store and selling alcoholic beverages at the property contrary to the A-1 Zoning District without a Town of Davie occupational license, and in violation of Section 12-32, which does not permit these uses, and that it was guilty of violating other provisions of the Davie Town Code. On June 26, 2002, the Special Master entered a Final Order, a copy of which was previously forwarded to the Mayor and Councilmembers by the Town Attorney’s Office on July 1, 2002. The Special Master concluded from the evidence presented at the hearing on June 4, 2002, and the supporting Memoranda of Law, that the Respondent, Rober Corporation, Inc. has been operating a convenience store and selling alcoholic beverages at the property contrary to the A-1 Zoning District without a Town of Davie occupational license and that as a result, the Respondent has violated Section 12-32, namely the operation of a convenience store and the sale of alcoholic beverages as non-permitted uses; Section 12-33(T), namely the consumption of alcoholic beverages and gathering of patrons on or about the interior and exterior of the premises constituting a neighborhood nuisance; Section 12-33(W), namely engaging in prohibited outdoor activities; and Section 13-17, namely engaging in a business without the required occupational license. The Special Master ordered the Respondent to comply with said provisions within sixty (60) days. The Order further required the Respondent to thereafter continuously comply with all of the aforesaid Davie Town Code Sanctions and failure to do would be considered a violation of the Order and the matter would then be set for hearing before the Special Master to consider the assessment of an administrative fine of up to \$250.00 per day per violation and the imposition of a lien as provided by §162.09 of the Florida Statutes. The Town Attorney’s Office has spoken with Mr. Stallone who has confirmed that the Respondent has in fact complied with the Special Master’s Order and he has removed all alcoholic beverages from the site and discontinued the sale of convenience store items. The Town Attorney’s Office has again spoken with Mr. Stallone, who has reconfirmed the fact that the Respondent has complied with the Special Master’s Order and has removed all alcoholic beverages from the site and discontinued the sale of convenience store items. In view of the Respondent’s compliance with the Order of the Special Master,

the Town Attorney's Office will now close its file on this matter.

13. **DePaola v. Town of Davie:** Plaintiff DePaola filed a lawsuit against the Town of Davie and the Town filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Dismiss was heard by Judge Burnstein who requested that both sides file Memoranda of Law in support of their positions and she took the case under advisement. Both sides did file their Memoranda of Law in support of their positions on the Town's Motion to Dismiss, and on November 13, 2002, the Court entered an Order granting the Town's Motion to Dismiss and entered an Order of Dismissal. The Court found that Mr. DePaola had administrative remedies as a career service employee, either by pursuing a civil service appeal or by a grievance procedure established under a collective bargaining agreement, but he had failed to pursue his administrative remedies. A copy the Court's Order of November 13, 2002, has been previously provided to the Town Council for its review. The Town Attorney's Office has been advised this date by Mr. Burke, the Florida League of Cities attorney, that the Plaintiff, DePaola, has filed a Motion with the Court for re-hearing of the Town's Motion to Dismiss. As soon as the Court has ruled upon Mr. DePaola's Motion for a re-hearing, the Town Attorney's Office will so advise the Town and Town Council.
14. **Southern Homes of Davie, LLC v. Davie (Charleston Oaks Plat) Case No. 02-015674 (11):** The Town was served with a Summons and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction and Petition for Writ of Mandamus with regard to Case Number 02-015674 (11) instituted by Southern Homes of Davie, LLC against the Town of Davie relevant to the "Charleston Oaks Plat". The Florida League of Cities has accepted responsibility for providing a defense to the Town of Davie relevant to this lawsuit and has assigned the case to Attorney Michael Burke. The Plaintiff is seeking both equitable relief and monetary damages against the Town. The Plaintiff is alleging that they have suffered injury as a result of the Town's refusal to process, review and/or approve its Site Plan Application while the Zoning in Progress has been in effect. They are seeking an Order declaring that the Plaintiff is entitled to approval of its Site Plan Application and that the Town be estopped to apply the "Zoning in Progress"; declaring that the Zoning in Progress does not exist and/or does not apply to Plaintiff's Site Plan Application and/or Plaintiff's property, and other relief. Since then, the Plaintiff has filed a second companion case also seeking a Declaratory Judgment and Injunction and Petition for Mandamus against the Town of Davie with regard to the "Flamingo Plat". This too, has been accepted for defense by the Florida League of Cities. Both cases have been since consolidated for discovery purposes and Mr. Burke's firm has filed its response to each Complaint filed in the two lawsuits. Mr. Burke has advised the Town Attorney's Office this date, November 25, 2002, that he has been in contact with the attorneys for the Plaintiff, and the attorneys are discussing a potential dismissal of both lawsuits in light of the Town Council's recent action in approving the recent code changes pertaining to the zoning in progress.
15. **Moises Narvaez v. Town of Davie:** Mr. McDuff, the League of Cities attorney assigned to this case, advises that Mr. Narvaez claims that while at the Players Pub bar, he was punched by another patron. According to the Davie Police that when they were summoned to the bar, they asked the Plaintiff, who had been hit in the face, whether he wanted medical attention and he indicated that he did not want medical attention. According to the Plaintiff, the next day when he awoke at home, he was unable to walk. Mr. McDuff indicates that while at

Memorial Hospital in Hollywood, the Plaintiff indicated that he was beaten by several individuals while walking home from the bar. Mr. McDuff indicates that at his deposition, Plaintiff later changed his account of what happened and is now contending that the Town was negligent in not providing him with medical attention at the time of the incident at the Players Pub bar. This matter was set for the trial period that was to have commenced November 4, 2002, but did not reach trial. The Plaintiff had previously offered to settle this case for the sum of \$250,000.00, which offer was rejected by the Florida League of Cities. The Town Attorney's Office has been advised this date that the case has in fact just settled and the Plaintiff has agreed to accept \$35,000.00 in settlement of his claim.

16. **Asset Management Consultants of Virginia, Inc. v. Town of Davie:** The Town of Davie has been sued by Asset Management Consultants of Virginia, Inc., who are seeking a refund of a public service fee imposed on certain property owners by the Town pursuant to Ordinance No. 99-35 of the Town Code. The Town filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint along with a Memorandum of Law in support of the Town's position. The Town's position is that at the time of the passage of Ordinance No. 99-35 of the Davie Town Code, it was properly initiated and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to a refund of the public services fees which were subsequently declared unconstitutional and contrary to Section 192.042 of the Florida Statutes by the Florida Supreme Court in 1999. The Town of Davie's Motion to dismiss the lawsuit was heard on Friday, November 15, 2002, and after Judge Greene heard lengthy oral argument on both sides, the Court granted the Town of Davie's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. The Judge granted our Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice as to Count II, which was a claim by the Plaintiff against the Town of Davie for unjust enrichment with regard to the Town of Davie's collection of the public service fee which was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. The Judge also granted the Town's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III in which the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and a refund of the public services fee that was collected relevant to the Plaintiffs. The Judge also struck with prejudice that portion of Count III which sought prejudgment interest against the Town if the Plaintiff is successful. The Judge did give the Plaintiff 20 days in which to amend Count I and the balance of Count III. A copy of the Court's Order of November 15, 2002, was previously forwarded to the Town for distribution to the Mayor and Councilmembers.